Part 1

• Russia as a patron of the Tatmadaw Michal Lubina Jagiellonian University in Krakow

  Russia-Myanmar relations can be characterized by promising perspectives and unfulfilled possibilities. This trend can be observed since 1920s when Soviet Union initially became an inspiration for Burmese nationalist movement, yet Burmese independence leaders ultimately chose to follow different paths. This pattern repeated itself during Burmese independence until 1988, when Burma chose socialist path of development, but followed firstly Yugoslavian way, then their own Burmese, autarkic one. After systemic transformation in late 1980s and early 1990s Myanmar and Russia reproached each other due to Western sanctions on Burma. Russia sold its arms to Burma and cooperated in nuclear sphere. However, since Burma’s opening to the West after 2011, Russia-Burma relations, despite being good on political level, remain unfulfilled: the concrete results were average at best. Before covid & coup, economically speaking in Russia-Burma relations only arms sales, export of Burmese rice and tourism mattered. The 2021 coup changed it all dramatically and made Russia a political player in Myanmar. What is the role of Moscow? How much Russia matters in Burmese politics? Why is Russia supporting the Tatmadaw? What are the limits of Russia’s influence? How will the Russian-Ukrainian war impact Russia’s support towards the Tatmadaw? This presentation will try to answer these questions.

• The product of the coup in Myanmar: Alarming lawlessness and deepening legitimacy crisis Ne Lynn Aung Independent Researcher

  A new wave of armed conflict emerged in the already conflict-ridden Myanmar in the aftermath of the 2021 coup d’état. Dozens of non-violent protestors who expressed their displeasure against the military rule were killed and maimed during the military’s crackdowns, assaults, and confrontations with mobs. The military’s uncontrolled violence shocked the public, and it pushed young protestors to “do-or-die” situation; moreover, it ignited the counter-violence across the country’s rural and urban areas. The new conflict is decentralized, inter-connected and complex; and the pattern of the ongoing conflict is different from multiple ethnic and political conflicts the country has experienced over the past five decades. The new conflict, although it is still in the nascent stage, has changed the country’s security landscape; and it is gradually escalating. Neither the military nor the armed opposition is likely to prevail in the foreseeable future, moreover, a mediated solution is unlikely to happen soon.

• The (Un)Making of the Myanmar Military Monolith Yatana Yamahata Nagoya University

  The Myanmar military had not only established dominant control of the state’s political, economic, and social spheres during decades of dictatorship, but also carefully maintained it during the democratic transition by continuing to employ ‘divide and rule’ tactics towards ethnic and religious minorities located in the peripheries. Although Myanmar’s brief period of political and economic liberalization from 2011-2020 was lauded as a triumph of democracy over dictatorship, the reality was far from the blueprint: the transition was uneven, and even had occurrences of conflict, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of violence at subnational levels. Therefore, the paper argues that the analysis of Myanmar’s praetorian and predatory civil-military relations cannot neglect discussions on centre-periphery relations. The paper explores the decades of complex centre-periphery relations in Myanmar and examines how that has contributed to the making of the ‘military monolith’ that is the coup regime and how its transformation driven by an anti-coup united front could inform the unmaking of it.

Part 2

• Continuing Urban Protest and People’s Solidarity against the Rising Lawlessness and Atrocities by the Regime Yumiho Wada Independent Researcher
• Japan’s Responses to Myanmar’s Post-coup Crisis: Supporting the Establishment or Promoting Democracy? Makiko Takeda Aichi Gakuin University

  This presentation examines Japan’s responses to Myanmar’s post-coup crisis, which are distinct from the US and other democratic countries. On one hand, most of those countries not only denounced and condemned the Tatmadaw but also imposed punitive economic sanctions upon military conglomerates and key individuals, on the other hand, Japan is rather inactive in taking decisive actions. Although Japan condemned the coup and announced to stop new ODA, it has neither imposed sanctions nor stopped ongoing ODA projects, which has been criticized by Myanmar citizens and academics as it consequently enables the military to survive and wield power. The presentation analyses the Japan’s responses after the coup by looking into the recent Japanese ODA projects to Myanmar and some Japanese key individuals which have developed strong tie with the military over the years. It also discusses whether Japan’s approach is promoting military entrenchment or people’s struggle for democracy.

• Stability over Democracy: The Catalyst of Myanmar’s Vicious Cycle of Political Instabilities Kyi Sin National University of Singapore

  The fear of instability is responsible for the decades-long cycle of instabilities in Myanmar. The successive Myanmar military governments’ attempts to stabilize the country with very little consideration for the equal rights of the ethnic minorities and the fundamental human rights led to further instabilities and significantly prolonged the civil war. Even under the short-lived civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi, the policy of favouring stability over equality did not alter much. Instead of uprooting the actual cause of the political crises and engaging with all parties involved, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government saw the compromise with the powerful Myanmar military as a shortcut to stability. The civilian government’s decision to compromise with the military to preserve the stable political environment at the expense of its ethnic minority allies and the international supporters ultimately failed to stop the coup of 2021. However, Myanmar’s regional partners are now following the path of the civilian government’s mistake in resolving the crisis. Regional countries are also worried about the Myanmar crisis becoming an uncontrollable crisis, destabilizing the entire region. Instead of engaging with all parties involved, the regional partners always favoured the engagement with the military governments and hoped to change the Myanmar military’s behaviour gradually. Such attempts to reach the negotiated settlement with the military alone to secure the short-term stability failed to resolve the crisis, and it will only motivate future coups.

Show Paper Abstracts

Abstract

Keywords

• Coup
• Minorities
• Myanmar
• Political Resistance
• Violence